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MILLER V. ALABAMA: SOMETHING UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
NOW WAS EQUALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL THEN 
W. Patrick Conlon∗  
Introduction 
In June 2012, the United States Supreme Court found 
mandatory life-without-parole sentences against juvenile offenders 
unconstitutional in Miller v. Alabama.1 The Court determined that 
because children possess “immaturity, impetuosity, and [fail] to 
appreciate risks and consequences,” they are fundamentally 
different than adults.2 Although Miller invalidated every juvenile 
mandatory life-without-parole (JMLWOP) statute across the United 
States, there is no clear indication regarding whether Miller 
retroactively applies to juveniles sentenced to mandatory life-
without-parole before the Court’s ruling.3  As a result, states are 
split on whether to apply Miller retroactively.4 
Fifteen states have yet to decide whether Miller applies 
retroactively, while several other states have either (1) declined to 
give Miller a retroactive effect or (2) passed legislation that does 
not apply Miller retroactively or provide for resentencing for 
JMLWOP.5 This Comment evaluates why the States should apply 
Miller retroactively. 
                                                   
 *  J.D. Candidate, May 2015, University of Michigan Law School. 
 1.  132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 2.  Id. at 2468–70.  
 3.  See id. at 2471.   
 4.  See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, Slow to Act: State Responses to 2012 Supreme Court 
Mandate on Life Without Parole 1 (2014), available at 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_State_Responses_to_Miller.pdf. 
 5.  Id. at 2.  
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I. Current State of JMLWOP Laws 
The Supreme Court has recognized that fundamental 
differences between juveniles and adults warrant different 
sentencing guidelines for each.6 In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme 
Court found that juvenile death penalty sentences are an 
unconstitutional violation of the Eighth Amendment.7 The Court 
reasoned that: 
[t]hree general differences between juveniles under 18 and 
adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with 
reliability be classified among the worst offenders. First, 
[. . .] a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults 
and are more understandable among the young. These 
qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered 
actions and decisions. [. . .] Second [,] [. . .] juveniles are 
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and 
outside pressures, including peer pressure. [. . .] Third, the 
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an 
adult.8 
Based on these three fundamental differences, the Supreme 
Court categorically distinguished juvenile from adults,9 
demonstrating the Court’s willingness to provide different 
sentencing guidelines for juveniles and adults. 
The Supreme Court further distinguished juveniles from adults 
in Graham v. Florida.10 In Graham, the Court acknowledged that life-
without-parole is “[t]he second most severe penalty permitted by 
law,”11 and held that JMLWOP sentences for non-homicide 
offenses were an unconstitutional violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.12 The Court reasoned that “developments in 
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental 
differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts 
of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature 
                                                   
 6.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 569–70 (internal quotations omitted).  
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2011). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
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through late adolescence.”13 Furthermore, the Court recognized 
that “[j]uveniles are more capable of change than adults, and 
[juvenile] actions are less likely to be evidence of irretrievably 
depraved character than are the actions of adults.”14  By again 
categorically banning certain sentences only for juveniles, the 
Court established that the offender’s age bears on the analysis.15 
Thus, Roper and Graham provided a strong foundation for the Miller 
Court to conclude that because “sentencers must be able to 
consider the mitigating qualities of youth,” JMLWOP sentences are 
unconstitutional.16 
A.  Miller v. Alabama 
In Miller, the Court tried two cases, both of which involved 
fourteen-year-old boys who were convicted of murder and 
statutorily given mandatory life-without-parole sentences.17 
The first case involved Kuntrell Jackson, a young teenager who 
accompanied two boys to a video store to commit a robbery.18 On 
the way to the store, Jackson learned that one of the other boys was 
carrying a shotgun.19 Jackson stayed outside during most of the 
robbery; however, when he entered the store, one of the other 
boys shot and killed the store clerk.20 The Arkansas trial court 
convicted fourteen-year-old Jackson of murder and sentenced him 
to mandatory life-without-parole.21 
In the second case, Evan Miller and a friend beat Evan’s 
neighbor and set fire to a trailer while the neighbor was inside.22 
The neighbor died and Miller was convicted of murder.  He 
received a statutorily-mandated life-without-parole sentence.23 
In response to these JMLWOP sentences, the Supreme Court 
took the opportunity to further explain why these harsh sentences 
are unconstitutional, noting that “[i]n neither case did the 
sentencing authority have any discretion to impose a different 
                                                   
 13.  Id. at 2026. 
 14.  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 15.  Id. at 2027. 
 16.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2459. 
 17.  Id. at 2457. 
 18.  Id. at 2461. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 2462.  
 23.  Id. at 2463.  
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punishment.”24 Rather, “State law mandated that each juvenile die 
in prison even if a judge or jury would have thought that his youth 
and its attendant characteristics, along with the nature of his 
crime, made a lesser sentence (for example, life with the possibility 
of parole) more appropriate.”25 Thus, the state statutes provided 
no alternative punishment upon conviction. 
By holding that juvenile mandatory life-without-parole 
sentences are unconstitutional, the Miller Court recognized the 
fundamental differences between juveniles and adults. The Court 
reasoned any JMLWOP sentence contravened “Graham’s (and also 
Roper’s) foundational principle: that imposition of a State’s most 
severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though 
they were not children.”26 Accordingly, the Court held that: 
[m]andatory life-without-parole for a juvenile precludes 
consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark 
features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and 
failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents 
taking into account the family and home environment that 
surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually 
extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It 
neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, 
including the extent of his participation in the conduct and 
the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. 
Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and 
convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies 
associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal 
with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea 
agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys.27 
Thus, JMLWOP sentences violate the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments because they 
prevent jurors and judges from considering a juvenile’s lessened 
culpability and capacity for change, and instead determine the 
juvenile remain in prison regardless of that individuals’ 
rehabilitation.28 
                                                   
 24.  Id. at 2460 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id. at 2483. 
 27.  Id. at 2468. 
 28.  Id. at 2460. 
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B. Current Retroactivity 
Currently, an estimated 2,500 juveniles in the United States are 
serving JMLWOP sentences.29 Most of these inmates, depending on 
their state’s position regarding Miller’s retroactivity, await the 
possibility of receiving resentencing hearings and reentering 
society. 
While some states are undecided on Miller’s retroactive effect, 
Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Texas 
apply Miller retroactively.30 Conversely, Supreme Courts in 
Louisiana, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania have ruled that Miller only 
applies to future cases and therefore has no retroactive effect.31 
Furthermore, of the thirteen states that have passed post-Miller 
legislation, only Delaware, North Carolina, Washington, and 
Wyoming allow retroactive resentencing for the JMLWOP 
population. Although some states are undecided, this Comment 
argues that Miller should apply retroactively. 
With respect to retroactivity, the Supreme Court held in Teague 
v. Lane32 that constitutional rules of criminal procedure do not 
apply to cases rendered final before the new rules were 
announced.33 However, the Court also held that new rules may 
apply retroactively if the rules require observance of “procedures 
that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”34 The Court 
further established that this exception pertains to “watershed rules 
of criminal procedure” and “new procedures without which the 
likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”35 
Although the Court later held in Danforth v. Minnesota36 that state 
courts do not need to use Teague’s analysis, several states have 
nevertheless adopted the Teague framework.37 
The next section argues that Teague’s exception to new 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure should encapsulate the 
                                                   
 29.  THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE SENTENCES IN 
AMERICA 11 (2013), available at 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Life%20Goes%20On%202 013.pdf. 
 30.  See supra note 5, at 3. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  489 U.S. 288 (1989).   
 33.  Id. at 290.  
 34.  Id.   
 35.  Id. at 311, 330.  
 36.  552 U.S. 264, 281 (2008). 
 37.  See Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 400, 414 (Fla. 2005) (Cantero, J., concurring) 
(“[M]ost states have adopted the Teague standard, at least when determining the 
retroactivity of constitutional decisions of the United States Supreme Court.”). 
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Court’s holding in Miller. 
II. States Should Apply Miller Retroactively 
Each state should apply Miller retroactively pursuant to Teague 
because Miller’s holding significantly reformed criminal procedure 
and affected the lives of inmates currently serving JMLWOP 
sentences. Inmates currently serving juvenile mandatory life-
without-parole sentences could not have constitutionally received 
such sentences today under Miller.38 Now, Miller requires that trial 
courts consider “how children are different [from adults], and how 
these differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a 
lifetime in prison.”39 The individuals currently serving JMLWOPs 
were not guaranteed these considerations during their trials. 
Miller’s new rules would have drastically impacted their sentences. 
Therefore, States should apply Miller retroactively to give these 
juveniles a proper evaluation of their sentencing in light of the 
additional considerations that Miller now requires. 
In addition to changing criminal procedure, Miller substantially 
reformed the law in holding that “mandatory life-without-parole 
sentences for juveniles are cruel and unusual violations of the 
Eighth Amendment.”40 Just because an inmate’s JMLWOP sentence 
was rendered before Miller does not mean that the JMLWOP 
sentence was any less unconstitutional. Imposing life-without-
parole sentences on juveniles “cannot be justified by the goal of 
rehabilitation”41 because inmates serving life-without-parole 
sentences “are often denied access to vocational training and other 
rehabilitative services that are available to others.”42 In denying 
juveniles basic rehabilitative services and a chance to reenter the 
community as a rehabilitated citizen, states make “irrevocable 
judgment[s] about that person’s value and place in society.”43 
Applying Miller’s holding retroactively will help provide convicted 
juveniles an opportunity for rehabilitation and assimilation back 
into society. 
Furthermore, judges who imposed JMLWOP sentences before 
                                                   
 38.  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460 (holding that JMLWOP sentences are 
unconstitutional.). 
 39.  Id. at 2469. 
 40.  Id. at 2464. 
 41.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029–30. 
 42.  Id. at 2030. 
 43.  Id.   
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Miller were unable to consider the soundness of such sentences. 
Rather, these judges were forced to abide by statutorily prescribed 
rules. Applying Miller retroactively, will provide judges with the 
opportunity to reassess the sentences of those 2,500 individuals 
serving JMLWOPs. This is a relatively manageable number that will 
never increase now that Miller applies to all future cases. Thus, 
judges will not be overly burdened by only having to reevaluate 
prior JMLWOP sentences. Regardless, these sentences should be 
reconsidered because many juveniles are serving what is now 
deemed an unconstitutional sentence. Since it would now be 
unconstitutional for these individuals to receive JMLWOP 
sentences, it is unlikely that their convictions before Miller are 
accurate. Furthermore, because Miller created a watershed rule of 
criminal procedure, Teague requires that states apply Miller 
retroactively. 
Conclusion 
One of the core functions of departments of corrections is to 
maintain “programs to enhance the success of offenders’ reentry 
into society.”44 Regardless of these programs’ efficacy to 
rehabilitate convicted individuals, the purpose of rehabilitation 
programs will not be fulfilled for individuals given JMLWOP 
sentences. For example, a now fifty-year-old individual who 
committed a crime at age fourteen and has since matured into a 
completely different person through the department of 
corrections’ rehabilitative programs will have no opportunity to 
reenter and contribute to society in a State that declines to apply 
Miller retroactively. Accordingly, it is difficult to understand what 
incentive these juveniles would have to rehabilitate when they 
know that there is zero possibility they will get to leave prison and 
reenter society because of a sentence they received as an 
undeveloped juvenile. Therefore, when Miller is given a retroactive 
effect, the purpose of rehabilitation is entirely unfulfilled. 
The 2,500 inmates in the U.S. currently serving JMLWOP were 
automatically sentenced upon a finding of guilt, regardless of their 
age.  If Miller only applies to future offenses, those 2,500 
individuals will never have a chance to reduce their sentence, 
irrespective of their good behavior in prison. By requiring 
                                                   
 44.  Agency Overview, ILL. DEP’T OF CORR. (Sept. 8, 2013),  
http://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/aboutus/Pages/IDOCOverview.aspx. 
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consideration of a juvenile’s age and the hallmark features of that 
age, applying Miller retroactively would grant those 2,500 
individuals a chance to have now unconstitutional statutorily-
imposed sentences reexamined. Moreover, states should apply 
Miller retroactively to incentivize inmates to rehabilitate themselves 
with the hope that they may receive a chance to reenter society. 
 
